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ABSTRACT
The present study examines the relationship between state electorate and state government
political ideologies and state legislative responses to payday lending. Payday lending is a form
of short-term, high-interest credit (e.g., Graves, 2003; Karger, 2005), and components of states’
legislative responses toward payday lending regulation serve as dependent variables in this
study. The internal determinants model serves as the policy innovation model, predicting the
attributes of states that influence legislative responses to social constructs (Berry & Berry, 1999;
Mohr, 1969). People espousing liberal political ideology believe in using governmental
intervention to ensure corporate social responsibility, while those adhering to a conservative
political ideology do not (Walters, 1977). The author predicted negative associations between
political ideologies and components of state legislative responses to payday lending indicating
more regulation. This study found four modest, significant correlations: (1) Between the
percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as liberal and that state’s legislated maximum
payday loan principle amount, (2) between the percentage of each state’s electorate identifying
as conservative and that state’s legislated maximum payday loan principle amount, (3) between
liberal state government political ideology and that state’s legislated maximum payday loan
principle amount, and (4) between the percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as liberal
and that state’s legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rate. No relationship
was found between liberal electorate political ideology and state legislated maximum payday
loan maturity terms or fee disclosure requirements; between conservative electorate political
ideology and state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates, state
legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms, or fee disclosure requirements; or between
liberal state government political ideology and state legislated payday loan implied maximum
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annual percentage rates, state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms, or fee disclosure
requirements. This suggests that the internal determinant, liberal political ideology, is associated
with using government intervention to regulate the state legislated maximum payday loan
principle amounts and state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates
that payday loan consumers can be charged.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Social workers, such as such as the profession’s pioneer Jane Addams, have historically
been concerned with economic inequality and its exacerbation of poverty (Lundblad, 1995;
Martin, 2012). Jane Addams both denounced the citizenry’s apathy toward changing social
conditions that exacerbated poverty and led large-scale settlement house advocacy efforts for
social welfare policies to reverse the adverse impact of poverty (Lundblad, 1995; Martin, 2012).
Because social workers have historically been (Lundberg, 1995; Martin, 2012) and should
presently be engaged in policy change efforts to reduce the adverse impact of poverty (Karger,
1990), payday lending serves as a contemporary example of a social construct of economic
inequality that exacerbates poverty (Karger, 2004, 2005; Melzer, 2011).
People in poverty often have few resources and a lack of access to inexpensive credit, and
this could pose a problem in the event that they cannot make monthly ends meet (Sapir &
Uhlich, 2003). A possible solution to this problem for those of the working class (Karger, 2005;
Stegman, 2001) or the middle class (Elliehausen & Lawrence, 2001) is the payday loan (e.g.,
Elliehausen & Lawrence, 2001; Karger, 2005; Sapir & Uhlich, 2003).
Payday loans are short-term, high-interest, small-dollar credit extensions for funds
(Karger, 2005). Generally, these loans mature at 2 weeks following the loan’s origination
(Karger, 2005), and the maximum loan principles amount to totals ranging from a low of $300 in
California and Montana to a high of $700 in the state of Washington (Pendus, Kuehn, & Brash,
2010). Borrowers do not receive payday loans free-of-charge (e.g., Graves, 2003); the interest
charges incurred for this form of credit usually amount to approximately $15 per $100 of the
principle (Stegman & Faris, 2003). At the origination of the payday loan, the borrower writes a
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post-dated check payable to the payday loan lender in the sum of the principle and interest
charges (Karger, 2005).
The borrower encounters several repayment alternatives at the maturity of the payday
loan. Such alternatives include using the post-dated check for repayment of the loan in full, or
alternatively defaulting and subjecting the loan to a collection agency or extending the original 2week payday loan maturation period by subsequent 2-week periods and remitting a service
charge—typically $45—to the payday lender for each extension (Ernst, Farris, & King, 2004;
Karger, 2005). The latter alternative is known as a payday loan rollover (Graves, 2003) or
renewal (Stegman, 2007). Nonsufficient funds (NSF) fees on delinquent checks, compounded
interest charges on subsequent payday loans, collection agency charges, and new customer fees
ranging between $10 and $15 serve as just a few examples of fees encountered with a rollover
(Karger, 2005). Such fees and interest charges fuel the profitability and proliferation of the
payday loan industry (Karger, 2005).
The need for funds becomes apparent to consumers concurrently upon the onset of the
sudden, unexpected event and the consumers’ realization that they have insufficient funds
available to finance the event (Melzer, 2011). In order to finance these events, unbanked (i.e.,
those without bank accounts) and/or unemployed consumers with lower annual incomes can
present tangible goods in exchange for short-term credit at pawn shops, and banked and
employed consumers with higher incomes can rely on credit cards or liquidated funds in savings
accounts (Karger, 2005). Between those consumer groups lies banked and employed consumers
with moderate annual incomes, a consumer population that can turn to payday lenders during
times of credit need (Karger, 2005). In general, about 50% of the payday loan consumer
population earns annual incomes between $25,000 and $49,999 (Elliehausen & Lawrence, 2001).
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[The findings reported by Elliehausen and Lawrence (2001) should be considered with caution
since the work “was supported, in part, by a grant from the Community Financial Services
Association of America” (Elliehausen & Lawrence, 2001, p. iii), the national trade association
for payday lenders (Community Financial Services Association of America [CFSA], 2012).
Payday lenders flourish in resource-impoverished communities, and banks flourish in
resource-rich communities (Graves, 2003). Others (Gallmeyer & Roberts, 2009) have reported
that payday loan outlets agglomerate in communities dense with immigrants, individuals selfidentifying with an ethnic minority group, individuals between 18 and 29 years of age or over the
age of 65, individuals employed in the construction industry, and individuals with an active
military personnel status. African American communities were home to three times as many
payday loan outlets as were white communities, regardless of education levels, income levels,
unemployment rates, age differences, gender identifications, homeownership status, number of
homes with children, and urban dwelling neighborhood status (King, Li, Davis, & Ernst, 2005).
Legislative responses to the payday lending problem differ by state (e.g., Pendus et al.,
2010). Prior research suggests that states adopt legislation to reconcile their policy needs with
their socioeconomic and political attributes (Alm & Rogers, 2011; Berry & Berry, 1999; Miller
& Wang, 2009; Weiner & Koontz, 2010), a model of policy adoption known as the internal
determinants model (Berry & Berry, 1999). This thesis hypothesizes that internal determinants
of state electorate political ideology and state government political ideology correlate with
different state legislative responses to the payday lending problem.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review begins with a brief discussion of the impact of payday loan use on a
consumer’s financial well-being and followed by an in-depth discussion of the payday loan
lending system and an outline of state-level payday loan legislative responses. Policy adoption
models used to predict the spread of policy innovation among the states are then discussed
(Berry & Berry, 1999). Next, determinants potentially linked to the spread of payday loan
policy responses are outlined. The literature review ends with this study’s hypotheses.
Impact of Payday Loans on Consumers’ Financial Well-Being
Members of the payday loan consumer group may obtain a payday loan to ease the
financial shock of unexpected expenses (Karger, 2005; Melzer, 2011; Stegman, 2001). However,
payday loan use increases a family’s future expense-paying ability (Melzer, 2011). Specifically,
a family’s geographical proximity to payday lenders (i.e., families living in counties whose
geographical center is less than 25 miles to a state in which payday loans can be obtained)
increased their probability of expense paying difficulty by 25% compared to a 20.3% sample
average (i.e., families living in counties whose geographical center is greater than 25 miles to a
state in which payday loans can be obtained) and increased their probability of postponing
healthcare needs (Melzer, 2011).
Understanding Payday Loans
Consumers obtain payday loans for a variety of reasons, and such reasons have been
organized into three different profiles of payday loan borrowers: the emergency borrower, the
strategic borrower, and the line-of-credit borrower (Anderson & Jackson, 2010). The emergency
borrower obtains a payday loan for an acute, unexpected need of funds (i.e., times of
emergency). Strategic borrowers pay bills that would otherwise be paid late thinking that the
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interest and fee charges associated with payday loans are lower than those charges associated
with late bill payments (Anderson & Jackson, 2010). The line-of-credit borrower obtains
numerous payday loans over the course of a year to emulate a revolving credit card line-of-credit
(Anderson & Jackson, 2010).
Two economic theories predict consumers’ decisions to obtain payday loans (Melzer,
2011). Both theories reflect the decisions in accord with the rational choice theory (Melzer,
2011), the notion that people decide to behave in a manner that will provide the best possible
outcome for their livelihood (McClennen, 2010). The borrowing to smooth current income or
consumption shocks theory posits that consumers might seek such expensive short-term credit to
help reconcile current decreases in income and increases in expenses (Melzer, 2011). A
consumer obtains a payday loan in such a case, because the consumer believes it would provide
more benefit to his or her livelihood than would a failure to make ends meet (Melzer, 2011). The
forecasting and commitment problems: borrowing costs and future distress theory predicts that
consumers obtain payday loans if they underestimate or fail to recognize the future interest
charges associated with such short-term credit (Melzer, 2011). The consumer believes a decision
to obtain a payday loan in this instance would maximize their livelihood more positively in the
present than adversely in the future (Melzer, 2011).
Examples of economic hardships toward which payday loan funds can be applied include
health, mortgage, rent, utilities, and food bills (Melzer, 2011). Sixty-seven percent of payday
loans in a sample of Arizona borrowers were used to finance living expenses, 23% for an acute
need of a greater amount of funds (e.g., times of emergency), and the remaining percentage for
unspecified reasons (Sapir & Uhlich, 2003).
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In the event that a consumer seeks a payday loan, he or she must present to the payday
lender credentials such as documentation for proof of residence (e.g., a state-issued identification
card, a home address); proof of employment and income (e.g., paycheck stubs, W-2 Forms,
checking account statement); and a minimum, continuous source of monthly income (Stegman,
2007). Continuous sources of monthly income could include government benefits such as
unemployment insurance or Social Security (Anderson & Jackson, 2010). Sometimes payday
loan lenders request personal references with contact information before granting a payday loan
(Karger, 2005).
After having submitted their credentials to the lender, the borrower relinquishes a
postdated check amounting to the sum of the loan principle and associated interest charges
(Karger, 2005). In turn, the lender provides the borrower with cash in the amount of the
principle and retains as collateral the postdated check (Karger, 2005). Once the payday loan
contractual period matures, the lender might cash the check and thus profit by retaining the
difference between the face value of the cashed postdated check and the principle (Karger,
2005).
Most payday loan contracts terminate in 2 weeks (Karger, 2005). Sapir and Uhlich’s
(2003) study of Arizona payday loan consumers found that 40% of borrowers had repaid their
payday loans within a 2-week period following origination, 16% within a 3- to 4-week period,
2% within 5- to 6- weeks, 16% by 7 to 8 weeks, while 14% repaid their payday loans within 9
weeks. (The remaining 12% of Sapir and Uhlich’s respondents specified no reimbursement
period.) Further, 33% of payday loans obtained by Sapir and Uhlich’s respondents amounted to
between $300 and $399, while 7% amounted to a total between $100 and $199, 20% between
$200 and $299, 9% between $400 and $499, and 24% equaling $500 (Sapir & Uhlich, 2003; note
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that 2% specified no amounts and that the percentage of the authors’ reported survey responses
equaled 95%).
Interest charges typically amount to approximately $15 for every $100 borrowed
(Stegman & Farris, 2003). Fox and Mierzwinski (2001) found that interest charges ranged
between $10 and $35 for every $100 borrowed. These fees are often converted to implied annual
percentage rates (Graves, 2003) for easy comparison to credit card interest charges (Stegman,
2007). In a sample of payday loans, the average state-sanctioned implied maximum annual
percentage rate (APR) was 470% and varied between 182% and 910% (Fox & Mierzwinski,
2001). Others (Pendus et al., 2010) found that implied maximum annual percentage rates in
states that sanctioned payday lending varied between 28% allowable in Ohio to 1,980%
allowable in Missouri. Only 63.5% of the nation’s state-level payday loan laws required the
lender to disclose all fees associated with the loan to the borrower (Pendus et al., 2010).
Borrowers encounter several reimbursement alternatives at the maturity of the payday
loan contract (Karger, 2005). Ideally, borrowers could allow the previously post-dated check to
clear their checking account, fulfilling the terms of the payday loan as agreed upon at origination
(Karger, 2005). Alternatively, borrowers could allow the loan to enter one of two default
alternatives: Renewals into subsequent 2-week payday loan maturation periods or submission to
a collection agency for reimbursement (Ernst et al., 2004; Karger, 2005). Lenders might use
their state’s nonsufficient funds collection laws in order to coerce and sue the borrower to
reimburse triple the amount of the payday loan, should the check written at the loan origination
prove delinquent (Fox & Mierzwinski, 2001).
In 2000, the payday lending industry earned $1.4 billion of fees through 41 million
payday loan transactions (Stephens Inc., as cited in Carr & Schuetz, 2001). Others (Robinson, as
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cited in Carr & Schuetz, 2001) reported that the payday lending industry earned $2.4 billion of
fees through 65 million transactions. These fees resulted in the stakeholders of publicly traded
payday loan companies reaping the rewards from such an industry (Stegman, 2001). The practice
of renewing payday loans into subsequent payday loan periods fuels the proliferation of and
profitability within the payday loan industry (Karger, 2005). To illustrate the point, borrowers
sometimes cannot fulfill their loan obligations as agreed upon at origination (Fox &
Mierzwinski, 2001). In such an instance, borrowers might renew their payday loan contract(s) if
they do not possess enough available funds to both fulfill the payday loan obligations and
maintain a proper level of sustenance until the borrower’s next paycheck (Fox & Mierzwinski,
2001). Renewals result in exponentially increasing interest and fee charges tacked onto the
borrower’s composite payday loan debt with each rollover (Graves, 2003), and herein lies the
profitability and proliferation of the industry (Fox & Mierzwinski, 2001).
Payday lenders attribute their profitability to the risk inherent in extending funds to low
income, credit compromised consumers for whom there are few other means of accessible credit
(Karger, 2005). Consumers of higher socioeconomic classes are generally considered to be
creditworthy and could rely upon and reimburse banking institutions for loan products should an
acute need arise for credit (Karger, 2005). The riskiest consumers to whom credit could be
granted, or the working poor, have been deemed unworthy of credit (Stegman, 2005) and the
interest and fee charges mitigate the great risk of credit default among this socioeconomic group
(Karger, 2005). In times of acute financial strain, such consumers utilize payday loans, pawn
shops, and/or other services within the fringe economy, or alternative financial services (AFS)
industry (Karger, 2005).
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Many have suggested that payday loan companies agglomerate in communities dense
with populations of particular socioeconomic demographics (e.g., Gallmeyer & Roberts, 2009;
Graves, 2003; King et al., 2005). For instance, Graves (2003) found that payday loan companies
agglomerated and banks were sparse in resource-impoverished communities, while, conversely,
banks agglomerated in and payday loan companies were sparse in resource-rich communities
(Graves, 2003). Gallymeyer and Roberts (2009) found statistically significant mean group
differences between communities with and without payday lenders with regard to the following
concepts: people living in poverty, immigrants, consumers from particular ethnic minority
groups, consumers between 18 and 29 years of age and over age 65, consumers serving as active
military personnel, and consumers employed in the construction industry. A three-to-one
proportion was suggested in terms of the total quantity of payday loan outlets in majority African
American communities as contrasted to majority white communities (King et al., 2005).
State Legislative Responses to Payday Lending
All states and the District of Columbia have either prohibited or regulated payday
lending, and this industry was found to be prohibited in 12 of the United States and in the
District of Columbia and legal in 38 states (Pendus et al., 2010). State payday loan statutes of
those 38 states were written such that 33 imposed maximum dollar amounts for payday loans, 33
set interest charges on 2-week payday loans amounting to an implied maximum annual
percentage rate, 20 imposed a minimum payday loan term (i.e., number of days from origination
to maturity), 29 imposed a maximum payday loan term (i.e., number of days from origination to
maturity), and 33 required payday lenders to fully disclose all fees to the borrowers (Pendus et
al., 2010). Anderson and Jackson (2010) reported that Florida’s payday loan statute allowed for
a maximum number of payday loans a borrower could concurrently have outstanding.
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Prohibition of Payday Lending. The practice of granting payday loans was banned in
12 states and in the District of Colombia (Pendus et al., 2010). Those states were Connecticut,
Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin as well as the District of Colombia
(Pendus et al., 2010). North Carolina was the first state in the nation to prohibit payday lending
(Center for Responsible Lending [CRL], 2010a, 2010b) citing its preexisting delinquent check
legislation as precluding payday lending on the basis that it was illegal to willfully post-date
checks for funds presently not had (Moss, 2000; Stegman, 2007).
Regulation of Payday Lending. The purpose of this section is to delineate and define
components of state payday loan regulation legislation of the remaining 38 states in which such
credit practices were sanctioned and regulated (Pendus et al., 2010). Components discussed
hereafter include the maximum payday loan principle amounts, the implied maximum annual
percentage rate, the minimum and maximum payday loan terms, and the disclosure of payday
loan fees.
Maximum Payday Loan Principle Amounts. Maximum payday loan principle amounts
were the largest amount of funds that a lender could extend to a borrower for a payday loan
(Stegman & Fairs, 2003). When written into state payday loan legislation, such maximums were
specified as explicit dollar amounts that payday loan principles cannot exceed (Pendus et al.,
2010). For instance, Louisiana stipulated that payday loan principle amounts in that state not
exceed $350 (Pendus et al., 2010).
Each state that regulates payday lending determines its maximum payday loan principle
amounts (Graves & Peterson, 2005). The lowest reported maximum payday loan principle
amount was $300 imposed by California’s and Montana’s state laws, while the highest maximum
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loan principle amount written into legislation was $700 in the state of Washington (Pendus et al.,
2010). Some states base the maximum payday loan principle amounts on borrower income. For
instance, Nevada and New Mexico state payday loan legislation allowed borrowers to obtain
payday loans of no greater than 25% of their gross monthly income (Pendus et al., 2010).
Finally, the state of Oregon was reported to allow borrowers earning a net annual income of no
more than $60,000 to seek payday loans for a maximum no greater than 25% of their net
monthly income (Pendus et al., 2010). The average maximum payday loan principle amount
allowed by state law was $484.17 (computed by author using data from Pendus et al., 2010).
Graves and Peterson (2005) opined that consumer protection is fostered by larger
maximum payday loan principle amounts than by smaller maximum payday loan principle
amounts. Specifically, to obtain larger fund amounts, consumers can pay lower amounts of
origination fees if state payday loan legislation allows them to obtain one larger payday loan
than multiple smaller payday loans, although the interest charges may differ (Graves & Peterson,
2005). Larger maximum payday loan principle amounts allow consumers to borrow greater
amounts of funds with a single payday loan, while smaller maximum payday loan principle
amounts could necessitate multiple payday loans for larger fund amounts (Graves & Peterson,
2005). Payday lenders charge various fees with each payday loan origination (Graves &
Peterson, 2005; Karger, 2005). Thus, larger maximum payday loan principle amounts can allow
consumers to borrow larger fund amounts with a single origination fee occurrence (Graves &
Peterson, 2005). Conversely, consumers may have to obtain multiple payday loans for larger
fund amounts, exposing them duplicative origination fee occurrences (Graves & Peterson, 2005).
Implied Maximum Annual Percentage Rate. The implied maximum annual percentage
rate of a payday loan is calculated by “annualizing the short-term cost” of the payday loan
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(Anderson & Jackson, 2010, p. 154). Three pieces of information must be known before the
implied maximum annual percentage rate of a payday loan can be calculated: (1) the amount of
funds the consumer wishes to borrow, usually the maximum payday loan principle amount (e.g.,
$350); (2) the dollar amount of the total finance charge to obtain the payday loan, usually the
sum of the fees charged per $100 borrowed (e.g., $50); and (3) maturity term of the payday loan,
usually the maximum payday loan term (e.g., 14 days; Arkansans Against Abusive Payday
Lending [AAAPL], 2006).
Upon gathering the aforementioned three pieces of information, the implied maximum
annual percentage rate can be calculated in four steps (AAAPL, 2006). The first step is to divide
the total finance charge (numerator) by the maximum payday loan principle (denominator; i.e.,
$50/$350 = 0.14; AAAPL, 2006). The next step is to multiply that answer by 365, or the number
of days in a year (i.e., 0.14*365 = 52.14; AAAPL, 2006). The third step is to divide such that
that product is the numerator and the maximum payday loan term is the denominator (i.e.,
52.14/14 days = 3.72; AAAPL, 2006). The final step is to convert that answer into a percentage
by moving the decimal place in that answer two places to the right (i.e., 3.72 becomes 372.45%);
thus, the implied maximum annual percentage rate on a $350, 14-day payday loan with a $50
total finance charge is 372.445% (AAAPL, 2006).
The simple method for consumers to calculate the dollar amount of the interest charges
of a single two-week payday loan rolled-over once (i.e., extended for an additional two weeks) is
to double the interest charged for the first two weeks of the payday loan contract (Martin, 2009).
Presumably, this is the amount of interest charged in a month (i.e., a month is typically four
weeks, or two two-week periods). It follows, then, that the interest charges over the course of a
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year can be calculated by multiplying the monthly interest charges by 12 (i.e., there are 12
months in a year).
In states that regulated annual percentage rates, the implied maximum annual percentage
rate allowed by state law was 28% in Ohio and the highest was 1,980% in Missouri (Pendus et
al., 2010). The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL; 2009) opined that states should
implement an implied maximum annual percentage rate of 36% or less and argued that “a twodigit interest rate cap is already saving [borrowers in] the 15 states and the District of Columbia
which enforce such a cap nearly $2 billion” (p. 2).
Maximum Payday Loan Maturity Term. Some states also mandated that payday loan
terms not exceed a particular quantity of days (Pendus et al., 2010). The shortest maximum
payday loan maturity term written in state payday loan legislation was 30 days in Minnesota and
the longest was183 days in North Dakota (Pendus et al., 2010).
The CRL (2010a, 2010b) recommended that legislators consider longer maximum
payday loan maturity terms for payday loan legislation, because this allows borrowers more time
to repay without incurring penalties. Since borrowers might have difficulty in concurrently
maintaining a livelihood and reimbursing their payday loan with their first post-payday loan
maturity paycheck (CRL, 2010a, 2010b; Fox & Mierzwinski, 2001), three to twelve months
provides enough time for borrowers to repay their payday loan and make ends meet (CRL,
2010a, 2010b).
Fee Disclosure Requirements. Fee disclosure requirements refer to the act of the payday
lender informing the payday loan borrower of the costs, benefits, and risks of obtaining a payday
loan (Bertrand & Morse, 2011). Empirical research has suggested that payday loan borrowing
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decreases by 11% after disclosing payday loan fees to the payday loan borrower (Bertrand &
Morse, 2011).
Policy Adoption Models
The diffusion of innovation and the internal determinants models serve as two insightful
theories that predict state legislative policy adoption attributes for the purpose of the present
thesis (Berry & Berry, 1999; Mohr, 1969). The former model examines the numerical order or
clustering of states in regards to the spread of policy trends among the states (Berry & Berry,
1999). The latter model examines the multiple links between a state’s propensity, or statistical
likelihood, to adopt a particular policy and that state’s socioeconomic and political attributes
(Berry & Berry, 1999; Mohr, 1969).
The concepts of innovation and invention must be differentiated before the two policy
adoption models can be discussed (Mohr, 1969). An innovation is the novel application of
preexisting means—a policy, for the purpose of the present work—to the solution of a problem,
whereas an invention is the creation of means as a solution (Mohr, 1969). Innovations refer to
new applications to problems, while inventions refer to new products (Mohr, 1969).
Diffusion of Innovation Model. The diffusion of innovation model predicts the manner
in which states emulate policy ideas of other states (Berry & Berry, 1999). Clusters of states
generally rank among the first and among the last in the emulation and adoption of policy ideas
(Berry & Berry, 1999). Such clusters result in a logical order of states in regards to the spread of
policy innovations (Berry & Berry, 1999). States adopt policy ideas that other states have
adopted for one or more of three reasons: (1) the policy idea has demonstrated effectiveness in
adoptive states, (2) states rival and compete against the other states and sense a need to adopt a
particular policy in order to compete or maintain superiority over the other states, and (3) public
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officials of one state may succumb to public pressure in regards to implementing another state’s
socially desirable, effective policy (Berry & Berry, 1999).
In summary, the diffusion of innovation model accounts for the general order in which
states adopt particular policy ideas rather than the characteristics of these states (Berry & Berry,
1999). In contrast, the internal determinants model accounts for the prediction of attributes of
states that adopt particular policy components (Berry & Berry, 1999) and thus serves as the
policy adoption model for the present cross-sectional analysis.
Internal Determinants Model. The internal determinants model predicts innovation as a
reconciliation between an organization’s environmental (i.e., external) attributes and its inherent
(i.e., internal) attributes (Mohr, 1969). An organization may encounter an environmental problem
and move to remedy it by applying preexisting means (Mohr, 1969). An organization’s internal
attributes preclude its ability to innovate: Innovation can occur if the organization has the
internal attributes, or capacity, to implement and maintain the innovation and vice versa (Mohr,
1969). Predictors of an organization’s ability to innovate include its resources, size, wealth, and
ideology and opinions (Mohr, 1969).
As for states responding to social problems, an innovation reconciles the states’ policy
response to the problem and their political and socioeconomic attributes (Berry & Berry, 1999).
States have the capacity to implement and maintain a policy innovation as a result of their
socioeconomic and political characteristics (Berry & Berry, 1999; Mohr, 1969). For instance,
political ideology in the form of citizen liberalism was found to be a strong, significant internal
determinant of states’ decisions to implement environmental initiatives (Matisoff, 2008).
Policy innovation serves as the conceptual dependent variable of most studies using the
internal determinants model (Berry & Berry, 1999). As such, policy innovation can be
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conceptualized as either the degree of earliness or the propensity that a state adopts a policy
(Berry & Berry, 1999).
Earliness of Policy Adoption. The degree of earliness of policy adoption by the states has
been studied in the literature of three ways (Berry & Berry, 1999). The latency, or quantity, of
years between a state’s adoption of a policy and the year of the first state’s policy adoption
represents earliness of policy adoption as an interval-level measure (Berry & Berry, 1999). The
numerical rank order in which states adopted a particular policy represents earliness of policy
adoption as an ordinal-level measure (Berry & Berry, 1999). Finally, Berry and Berry (1999)
cited some works that have represented state policy adoption as the categorical presence or
absence of a state’s adoption of a policy at a particular point in time.
Propensity of Policy Adoption. The propensity of a state to adopt a particular policy can
also indicate policy innovation and refers to the probability that a state will adopt a particular
policy within a given timeframe of years (Berry & Berry, 1999).
State Determinants
The internal determinants model of state policy adoption posits that each state adopts
policies based on its political and socioeconomic attributes (Berry & Berry, 1999).
Political Determinants. Political ideology, or the political values and beliefs of the
voting-eligible citizens of a state’s population (e.g., Miller & Wang, 2009; Weiner & Koontz,
2010), serves as a valuable political determinant, because liberal or conservative ideologies
influence policy change based on the worldviews of groups of people identifying as liberal or
conservative (Grafton & Permaloff, 2008). Policy responses to payday lending are political
issues (Stegman, 2007), with some groups of people condemning exploitation of the poor and
other groups valuing unrestricted, free trade (Faller, 2008). Those of the liberal political
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ideology generally view government regulation of corporations as appropriate and necessary to
assure corporate social responsibility, and conservatives generally view such responsibility as a
hindrance to profitability and rarely as a government responsibility (Walters, 1977). Both the
political ideology of state electorates and of state government officials have been used as the unit
of analysis in previous internal determinants or diffusion of innovation studies (e.g., Miller &
Wang, 2009; Weiner & Koontz, 2010). A discussion of both concepts follows.
State Electorate Political Ideology. Political ideology refers to the general social policy
views of groups of people within a defined community (Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz, 2006),
and the political ideology of each state’s electorate serves as a political determinant in several
studies (e.g., Miller & Wang, 2009; Weiner & Koontz, 2010).
State Government Political Ideology. The political ideology of state governments refers
to the majority political persuasion of state politicians and is known as government political
ideology (Erikson et al., 2008). State government political ideology is a concept worth measuring
independently from state electorate political ideology (Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, &
Klarner, 2010). It cannot be assumed that an elected official’s political ideology is perfectly
congruent with his or her electorate’s political ideology (Berry et al., 2010). In other words, an
elected official or the media could portray the elected official’s political ideology one way preelection, and the elected official’s post-election governing behavior could suggest the same or a
drastically different political ideology (Berry et al., 2010).
Summary
Payday lenders entice financially strained consumers with a quick and seemingly easy
credit extension to help consumers make ends meet (e.g., Karger, 2005; Melzer, 2011).
Consumers reimburse payday lenders with large amounts of interest, typically $15 per $100 of
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the payday loan principle (Stegman & Faris, 2003). Each state responds to the payday lending
business through either restrictions or prohibitions of the practice (Pendus et al., 2010). The
internal determinants model of policy adoption serves as a convenient lens through which to
examine state legislative responses to various social problems (Berry & Berry, 1999; Mohr,
1969). Political ideology, or identification as either liberal or conservative (e.g., Berry et al.,
2007; Brace et al., 2007), has been studied as a determinant of state legislative responses to
social problems (e.g., Miller & Wang, 2009; Weiner & Koontz, 2010).
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The consequences of payday loans on consumers’ financial health have been argued
extensively throughout the literature (e.g., Graves, 2003; Graves & Peterson, 2005; Karger,
2005; Melzer, 2011). On the other hand, the states’ legislative responses to the payday lending
problem have not been studied with a nationwide scope. The purpose of this thesis is to
determine if relationships exist between state electorate and government political ideology and
states’ legislative responses to payday lending. Thirty-eight states have legislated restrictions or
regulations on payday lending, while 12 states and the District of Columbia have legislatively
prohibited the lending practice (Melzer, 2011; Pendus et al., 2010). Considering that individuals
with a liberal political ideology rather than a conservative ideology prefer legislating corporate
social responsibility (Walters, 1977), the general hypothesis is that liberal political ideology is
positively correlated with stricter payday loan laws. In the hypotheses below, the direction of the
relationship differs depending on the measure of payday loan legislation used (see Chapter 3 for
operational definitions).
Larger state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts provide payday loan
consumers the opportunity to borrow greater amounts of funds with fewer payday loan contracts
(Graves & Peterson, 2005). Consequently, such a payday loan regulation component allows
payday loan consumers fewer opportunities to incur duplicative payday loan origination and
application fees, and for this reason, larger state legislated maximum payday loan principle
amounts indicate stricter payday lender regulation law components (Graves & Peterson, 2005).
Smaller state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates provide for less
payday loan interest charges that payday loans can accrue, and for this reason, they indicate
stricter payday lender regulation law components (CRL, 2009). Larger state legislated maximum
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payday loan maturity terms provide longer periods of time for payday loan consumers to
simultaneously reimburse their loans and use their subsequent post-payday loan origination
paychecks to maintain a minimum standard of living, and for this reason, they indicate stricter
payday lender law components (CRL, 2010a, 2010b; Fox & Mierzwinski, 2001). Fee disclosure
requirements mandated by each state’s payday loan law helps consumers determine the costs of
the payday loan they are about to obtain, and for this reason, they indicate stricter payday lender
law components (Bertrand & Morse, 2011).
H1 State Legislated Maximum Payday Loan Principle Amounts Hypotheses
H1.1

The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as liberal is positively correlated

with state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts.
H1.2

The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as conservative is negatively

correlated with state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts.
H1.3

State government political ideology scores (hereafter, GI; higher scores indicate greater

liberal political ideology) are positively correlated with state legislated maximum payday loan
principle amounts.
H2 State Legislated Payday Loan Implied Maximum Annual Percentage Rates Hypotheses
H2.1 The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as liberal is negatively correlated
with state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates.
H2.2

The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as conservative is positively

correlated with state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates.
H2.3

State government political ideology scores are negatively correlated with state legislated

payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates.
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H3 State Legislated Maximum Payday Loan Maturity Terms Hypotheses
H3.1

The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as liberal is positively correlated

with state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms.
H3.2

The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as conservative is negatively

correlated with state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms.
H3.3

State government political ideology scores are positively correlated with state legislated

maximum payday loan maturity terms.
H4 Fee Disclosure Requirements Hypotheses
H4.1

The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as liberal is positively correlated

with the presence of fee disclosure requirements.
H4.2

The percentage of each state’s electorate identifying as conservative is negatively

correlated with the presence of fee disclosure requirements.
H4.3

State government political ideology scores are positively correlated with the presence of

fee disclosure requirements.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS
The present study utilized a cross-sectional design using secondary data obtained from
numerous websites (all data sources are cited within the References list); thus, exemption by the
Louisiana State University Institutional Review Board was granted.
Dependent Variables
Three ratio-level and one nominal-level dependent variables (i.e., state legislated
maximum payday loan principle amounts, state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual
percentage rates, state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms, and a fee disclosure
requirement) comprised the dependent variable category of type of state payday loan legislation
and were derived primarily from the Pendus et al. (2010) dataset. (All data decisions regarding
each of the four dependent variables will be discussed in detail in subsections hereafter.) As a
prerequisite to the following variable discussions, note that the study consisted of the population
of states in the United States (50) and the District of Columbia for which data were available.
State Legislated Maximum Payday Loan Principle Amounts. The first ratio-level
dependent variable was state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts, or the highest
dollar amount for which a payday loan can be granted (Graves & Peterson, 2005; Pendus et al.,
2010). All 50 states and the District of Columbia were considered for analysis, but the final
sample consisted of 45 jurisdictions (i.e., 44 states and the District of Columbia). Pendus et al.
(2010) provided 30 specific state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts, two (i.e.,
Nevada and New Mexico) described as 25% of gross monthly income, and one (i.e., Oregon)
described as 25% net monthly income for ≤$60K net yearly income, no limit for higher earner.
The Pendus et al. (2010) dataset provided no state legislated maximum payday loan principle
amounts for the five states in which payday lending is regulated but had missing data (i.e., Idaho,
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Illinois, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming; Pendus et al., 2010) and the District of Columbia and the 12
states in which payday lending has been prohibited (i.e., Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin; Pendus et al., 2010).
The final sample consisted of 45 jurisdictions (i.e., 44 states and the District of
Columbia). Pendus et al. (2010) provided 30 specific state legislated maximum payday loan
principle amounts, but only 28 of them were included in the final analysis. Data were present for
Alaska and Hawaii in the dependent variable data set and missing from one of the two
independent variable data sets. Consequently, both states were excluded in the final analysis.
(Thus far, n = 28.)
The criteria for this variable for the states of Nevada and New Mexico were described in
the data set as 25% of gross monthly income (Pendus et al., 2010). The procedure described
herein was used to calculate the state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts for
both states using data from the American Community Survey. First, the per-capita income for
Nevada (Bureau of the Census, 2005b; 2006b; 2007b; 2008b; 2009b) and New Mexico (Bureau
of the Census, 2005c; 2006c; 2007c; 2008c; 2009c) were obtained for the years 2005-2009.
These five years were selected, because the Pendus et al. (2010) data set spanned those years. A
5-year per-capita income for each state was computed. That figure was divided by 12 months to
compute a monthly per-capita income, and finally that figure was multiplied by 0.25 to estimate
the state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts for those states. (Thus far, n = 30).
The data for Oregon were excluded from the final analysis, because the dataset had listed
a state legislated maximum payday loan principle amount that depended on one of two options:
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25% net monthly income for ≤$60K net yearly income, no limit for higher earners (Pendus et al.,
2010). (Thus far, n = 30).
Data for this dependent variable were missing from the Pendus et al. (2010) dataset and
were retrieved from Payday Loan Laws (2011c; 2011d; 2011j; 2011k; 2011m) for the states of
Idaho, Illinois, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. However, the states of Texas, Utah, and Wyoming
have no state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts (Payday Loan Laws, 2011j;
2011k; 2011m) and were considered missing from the final analysis. Additionally, Illinois’s state
legislated maximum payday loan principle amount was dependent upon one of two options:
$1000 or 25% of the consumer's monthly income (Payday Loan Laws, 2011d). Thus, the 5-year
average per-capita monthly income for Illinois (Bureau of the Census, 2005a; 2006a; 2007a;
2008a; 2009a) was calculated in the manner it was for Nevada and New Mexico. That amount
was used as Illinois’s state legislated maximum payday loan principle amount, as it was less than
$1,000 (i.e., $573.72; Payday Loan Laws, 2011d; Thus far, n = 32).
Finally, a value of 0 was assigned for this variable to each of the 12 states and the District
of Columbia in which payday lending was prohibited, since in this context, prohibition means
that the highest amount of funds for which a payday loan can be granted is $0. (Thus far, n = 45).
Six states (Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming) were treated as missing
for this dependent variable. All state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts can be
found in the column maximum loan amount within Table A.3: Payday Loan Restrictions for
2005-2009 Period by State of Pendus et al. (2010).
State Legislated Payday Loan Implied Maximum Annual Percentage Rates. The
ratio-level dependent variable state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage
rates were defined as the highest percent of interest a payday lender can charge a payday loan

24

consumer annually and calculated by extending the short-term cost of a 2-week payday loan to a
year’s time (as mentioned in the earlier literature review; Anderson & Jackson, 2010; Pendus et
al., 2010). All 50 states and the District of Columbia were considered for analysis, but the final
sample consisted of 44 jurisdictions (i.e., 43 states and the District of Columbia).
Pendus et al. (2010) provided 33 specific state legislated payday loan implied maximum
annual percentage rates. The Pendus et al. (2010) dataset provided no state legislated payday
loan implied maximum annual percentage rates for five states (i.e., Delaware, Idaho, Nevada,
South Dakota, and Utah) in which payday lending was regulated and the District of Columbia
and the12 states in which payday lending has been prohibited (i.e., Connecticut, Georgia, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin; Pendus et al., 2010).
The final sample consisted of 44 jurisdictions (i.e., 43 states and the District of
Columbia). Thirty-one of the 33 specific state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual
percentage rates provided by Pendus et al. (2010) were included in the final analysis. Data were
present for Alaska and Hawaii in the dependent variable data set and missing from one of the
two independent variable data sets. Consequently, both states were excluded in the final analysis.
(Thus far, n = 31.)
Data for this dependent variable were missing from the Pendus et al. (2010) dataset and
were retrieved from Payday Loan Laws (2011b; 2011c; 2011f; 2011i; 2011k) for the states of
Delaware, Idaho, Nevada, South Dakota, and Utah. However, none of those states has state
legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates (Payday Loan Laws, 2011b;
2011c; 2011f; 2011i; 2011k) and was considered missing from the final analysis. (Thus far, n =
31).
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Finally, a value of 0 was assigned for this variable to the District of Columbia and the 12
states in which payday lending was prohibited, since the defacto maximum annual percentage
rate for a payday loan in states that prohibit payday lending is 0. (Thus far, n = 44). Seven states
(Alaska, Hawaii, Delaware, Idaho, Nevada, South Dakota, and Utah) were treated as missing for
this dependent variable. All state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage
rates can be found in the column APR Cap Amount, 2007-2009 within Table A.3: Payday Loan
Restrictions for 2005-2009 Period by State of Pendus et al. (2010).
State Legislated Maximum Payday Loan Maturity Terms. The ratio-level dependent
variable state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms were defined as the maximum
number of days within a payday loan repayment period (Pendus et al., 2010). All 50 states and
the District of Columbia were considered for analysis, but the final sample consisted solely of 35
states (i.e., the District of Columbia was excluded from this particular analysis). Pendus et al.
(2010) provided 26 specific state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms for states that
had regulated payday lending and 3 that had prohibited it. The remaining 22 states consisted of
missing state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms data: 12 of states that had
regulated payday lending and 10 (i.e., 9 states and the District of Columbia) that had prohibited it
(Pendus et al., 2010).
The final sample consisted solely of 35 states (i.e., the District of Columbia was excluded
from this particular analysis). Twenty-five of the 26 specific state legislated maximum payday
loan maturity terms for states that had regulated payday lending were included in the final
analysis. Data were present for Hawaii in the dependent variable data set and missing from one
of the two independent variable data sets. Consequently, Hawaii was excluded in the final
analysis. The three specific state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms for states that
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had prohibited payday lending (i.e., Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Wisconsin; Pendus et
al., 2010) were also excluded from the final analysis. (Thus far, n = 25).
Missing data for the 12 states (i.e., Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming) that had
regulated payday lending were retrieved from National Conference of State Legislators (2011)
for New Hampshire and Ohio, and from Payday Loan Laws (2011a; 2011c; 2011d; 2011e;
2011g; 2011h; 2011j; 2011l; 2011m) for the remaining states. Wyoming’s legislated maximum
payday loan maturity term was conceptually defined as one month (Payday Loan Laws, 2011m).
Thus, it was operationalized as 31 days for the present analysis. Furthermore, Alaska was coded
as missing to maintain consistency with the variable decisions of the previous two dependent
variables. The state of Arizona has no state legislated maximum payday loan maturity term
(Payday Loan Laws, 2011a), so it was excluded as well. (Thus far, n = 35).
Finally, the states that had prohibited payday lending and had missing data for state
legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms were excluded from the final analysis. (Thus
far, n = 35). All 16 excluded data points were treated as missing for this dependent variable. All
state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms can be found in the column Max Loan
Period (Days) within Table A.3: Payday Loan Restrictions for 2005-2009 Period by State of
Pendus et al. (2010).
Fee Disclosure Requirement. The nominal-level dependent variable was a fee
disclosure requirement, or the presence or absence of a mandate in each state’s payday loan
legislation for payday lenders to fully disclose the payday loan contract terms, fees, and
conditions to payday loan consumers (ALA. CODE § 5-18A-13(m) and ALA. CODE § 5-18A13(f), as cited in Graves & Peterson, 2005; Pendus et al., 2010). All 50 states and the District of
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Columbia were considered for analysis, but the final sample consisted solely of 36 states.
Twelve states and the District of Columbia were excluded from the final analysis, because they
had prohibited payday lending. Two states (Alaska and Hawaii) had missing data for one of the
two independent variables. All fee disclosure requirements can be found in the column Fee
Disclosure Requirement within Table A.3: Payday Loan Restrictions for 2005-2009 Period by
State of Pendus et al. (2010).
Independent Variables
This study included two independent variables: One measure of state electorate political
ideology and one measure of state government political ideology. The CBS/NYT poll’s state
electorate political ideology data (Wright et al., 2003) were retrieved from Wright’s personal
website hosted on his institution’s (i.e., Indiana University’s) server. Berry et al.’s (1998a)
annual governmental political ideology index data were retrieved from Richard Fording’s
personal website on his institution’s (i.e., University of Alabama’s) server.
State Electorate Political Ideology. The CBS/NYT poll (Wright et al., 1985; 2003) was
a nationwide telephone survey in which voters identified their political ideology (i.e.,
conservative, moderate, or liberal) by answering the questions, “How would you describe your
views on most political matters? Generally, do you think of yourself as liberal, moderate, or
conservative?” (Wright, Erikson, & McIver, 1985, p. 471). Both weighted and unweighted
percentages for each of the three political ideologies (i.e., conservative, moderate, and liberal) for
about two-and-a-half decades (Wright et al., 1985; Wright et al., 2003) were provided in Wright
et al.’s (2003) dataset. The present study used the unweighted percentages, because the seminal
article of the CBS/NYT poll of state electorate political ideology percentages (Wright et al.,
1985) advised to use the unweighted percentages to obtain a true, sterile portrayal of the political
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ideology of a representative sample of each state’s active electorate. The weighted percentages
represent the political ideology of each state reconciled by education, race, sex, age, and the
proportion of registered and unregistered voters. Each state’s active electorate, as measured by
the unweighted state electorate political ideology percentages, determines each state’s
policymakers and therefore is more congruent with state legislative responses to social issues
(Wright et al., 1985). Further, the conservative and liberal unweighted and weighted percentages
are strongly and positively correlated with one another (respectively for each political ideology, r
= .85 and .94; Wright et al., 1985).
State Government Political Ideology Measure. The Berry et al. state
government political ideology measure (hereafter referred to as the GI measure; Berry et
al., 1998b) consists of annual political ideology scores for each state that range from 0 to
100, with lower scores indicating more conservative ideology and higher scores
indicating more liberal ideology (Berry et al., 1998b; Berry et al., 2010). For the present
analysis, each state’s GI measure score for the year 2003 was used with the exception of
those from Alaska and Hawaii (Berry et al., 1998a). Those states were omitted from the
final analysis, because the data were missing (Berry et al., 2008) as discussed earlier.
To calculate the GI measure, the authors began by averaging the Americans for
Democratic Action (ADA, an organization espousing liberal political ideology) and AFLCIO Committee on Political Education (COPE) ratings of their political ideology
perceptions of each state’s congressional delegation (Berry et al., 2010). In regard to
calculating the former measure, the ADA’s Legislative Committee identifies 20 articles
of legislation of importance to the ADA that both chambers of the United States Congress
had voted upon in a roll-call vote during the prior Congressional legislative session
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(ADA, 2008). Each member of Congress is scored on each of the 20 articles of
legislation, receiving a score of 5 if the legislators’ vote (i.e., yea or nea) is congruent
with the ADA’s preference or a score of 0 for both absent votes and votes contradictory
to the ADA’s preference (ADA, 2008). The individual scores on each legislator’s 20
votes are summed to constitute the ADA’s annual measure of members of Congress
(ADA, 2008).
In regard to calculating the latter measure, the AFL-CIO COPE identifies articles
of legislation of importance to the AFL-CIO that both chambers of the United States
Congress had voted upon in a roll-call vote during the prior Congressional legislative
session (Carson & Oppenheimer, 1984; Pohlmann & Crisci, 1982). These articles of
legislation represent various topic areas, such as labor relations, civil rights and civil
liberties, and energy deregulation (Pohlmann & Crisci, 1982). The COPE measure
represents the percentage of each Congress member’s votes that are congruent with the
AFL-CIO’s vote preference (i.e., yea or nea) for these identified articles of legislation of
importance (Carson & Oppenheimer, 1984).
To begin the calculation of the GI measure, the average of the ADA and COPE
scores are calculated for the mean member of each state’s Congressional delegation
(Berry et al., 1998b). Those averages are then weighted twice considering each state’s
governmental situation, once considering the distribution of power of the legislators of
each chamber of each state’s legislature and once considering the influence exerted by
each state’s legislature and governor (Berry et al., 1998b). The former weight is a
proportion that varies among the states based on the quantity of legislators identifying
with a given political party (hereafter, seats) in order for that party to attain the slightest
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majority necessary to secure the final voting outcome of legislation in that particular
chamber (hereafter, power; Berry et al., 1998b). Berry et al (1998b) calculated the GI
measure multiple times for various combinations of the seats-to-power proportions and
found high correlations among all trials of each weighted version of the GI measure.
Because of the high correlations, the authors selected intermediate seats-to-power
proportion weights of .60 for the majority party to control the final voting outcome of
legislation in a particular chamber and .40 for the power remaining for the minority party
(Berry et al., 1998b).
The latter weight involves the political influence exerted by each state’s governor
and legislature (Berry et al., 1998b). The political influence of each state’s governor is
considered a proxy in the GI measure by weighting each state’s mean ADA/COPE score
by .50 (Berry et al., 1998b). Additionally, the political influence of each state’s
legislature is considered a proxy in the GI measure by weighting the product of each
state’s mean ADA/COPE score and seats-to-power proportions by .25 for both chambers
of each state’s legislature (Berry et al., 1998b). Thus, each state’s final GI measure score
represents the sum of three products: (1) the political influence (i.e., .50) multiplied by
the ideology rating of its governor, (2) the political influence (i.e., .25) multiplied by the
seats-to-power ratio multiplied by the ideology rating of the upper chamber of its
legislature, and (3) the political influence (i.e., .25) multiplied by the seats-to-power ratio
multiplied by the ideology rating of the lower chamber of its legislature (Berry et al.,
1998b).
The acceptance of the GI measure as a reliable and valid instrument to measure
state government political ideology is based on four assumptions (Berry et al., 1998b).
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First, parallel forms reliability exists between the articles of legislation selected by both
ADA and COPE and was demonstrated by a statistically-significant correlation was
found between the political ideology scores of both groups (r = .88; Berry et al., 1998b).
Second, Berry et al. (1998) argued that the mean ADA and COPE score of a
state’s Congressional delegation is an appropriate proxy for political ideology of a state’s
legislature. Only a few states have in-state lobbyists engaged in the practice of rating
their state legislatures, and the mean ADA and COPE score strongly correlated with those
ratings (r = .95). According to Berry et al. (1998b), that correlation between the two
measures provides evidence that the political ideology of each state’s Congressional
delegation serves as an appropriate proxy for the political ideology of each state’s
legislature.
Third, within each state’s legislature, both chambers each presumably hold half of
the political power of the legislative branch’s distribution of political power of state
government outcomes (Berry et al., 1998b). The weights of .50 (i.e., the political
influence of each state’s governor) and .25 (i.e., the political influence of each chamber
of each state’s legislature) appropriately represent the balance of political influence that
those components exert in shaping state policy (Berry et al., 1998b). In other words, the
governor and the legislature each hold half of the political power of state government
outcomes (Berry et al., 1998b).
Finally, political power of a political party in a state legislative chamber is equal
for both parties if the number of seats held by both parties is equal (Berry et al., 1998b).
If the quantity of seats held by both parties is unequal, the party with the majority of seats
controls approximately 60% of the political influence of that state legislative chamber
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(Berry et al., 1998b). The party with the majority of seats has complete control of the
political influence of that state legislative chamber once it holds 60% of the seats in that
chamber (Berry et al., 1998b).
Statistical Procedures
Descriptive statistics and bivariate inferential statistics were completed in the present
investigation. Descriptive statistics included frequencies and percentages for the categorical
variables of states with payday loan lending regulation statutes and those with payday loan
lending prohibitory statutes. Central tendency and dispersion statistics were calculated for the
following ratio-level variables: state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts, state
legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates, state legislated maximum
payday loan maturity terms, the CBS/NYT state electorate political ideology percentages
(Wright et al., 1985, 2003) for the liberal and conservative state electorate political ideologies,
and the ADA/COPE state government political ideology scores (Berry et al., 1998b).
Pearson’s r correlations were performed with and without outliers to determine if a
relationship exists between state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts; state
legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates; state legislated maximum
payday loan maturity terms and the independent variables: the CBS/NYT state electorate liberal,
moderate, and conservative political ideology percentages (Wright et al., 1985; Wright et al.,
2003) and the state government political ideology scores (Berry et al., 2008). Outliers were
defined as states with z-scores exceeding an absolute value of 3.0.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
This cross-sectional study of state electorate and state government political ideology and
state payday loan legislation components yielded mixed results.
Frequencies and Percentages
Dependent Variables. The mean state legislated maximum payday loan principle
amount was $355.64 (SD = $251.27), followed by means of 340.5% (SD = 348.6%) for state
legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates and 43.34 days (SD = 27.83)
for state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms. (See Table 1, Descriptive Statistics
With Outliers).
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics With Outliers

n

(%)

M

(sd)

1. Maximum Principle Amounts

355.64 (251.27)

2. Implied Maximum APRs

340.50 (348.58)

3. Maximum Maturity Terms

43.34 (27.83)

4. Fee Disclosure Requirements

31 (86.11%)

5. Liberal Electorate Political Ideology

20.0

(6.46)

6. Conservative Electorate Political Ideology

34.59 (7.47)

7. State Government Political Ideology

49.82 (27.58)

Note: Numbers represent means and standard deviations unless otherwise indicated: % of states
where condition is met and number.
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Liberal Political Ideology of State Electorates
Liberal political ideology of state electorates was represented in the present analysis as
percentages of respondents in a telephone survey of each state’s electorate that identified liberal
as their political ideology. Higher percentages indicate greater levels of each state’s respondents
identifying as liberal (Wright et al., 1985; Wright et al., 2003). Data were used for 48 states and
the District of Columbia, excluding Alaska and Hawaii as mentioned in an earlier chapter. The
mean percentage of political ideology of state electorates that identified as liberal was 20.0%
(SD = 6.45%) between a minimum of 11.0% and a maximum of 46.3%.
Conservative Political Ideology of State Electorates
Conservative political ideology of state electorates was represented in the present
analysis as percentages of respondents in a telephone survey of each state’s electorate that
identified conservative as their political ideology. Higher percentages indicate greater levels of
each state’s respondents identifying as conservative (Wright et al., 1985; Wright et al., 2003).
Data were used for 48 states and the District of Columbia, excluding Alaska and Hawaii as
mentioned in an earlier chapter. The mean percentage of state electorates that identified as
conservative was 34.6% (SD = 7.47%) between a minimum of 7.7% and a maximum of 49.6%.
Political Ideology of State Governments
Political ideology of state governments was represented in the present analysis as a
weighted proportion of the political ideology of each state’s governor and legislator, with lower
scores representing greater degrees of conservative political ideology and higher scores
representing greater degrees of liberal political ideology (Berry et al., 1998b; Berry et al., 2010).
The mean for this independent variable was 49.82 (SD = 27.58) between a maximum of 92.51
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and a minimum of 5.25. Data were used for 48 states and excluded for Alaska and Hawaii and
missing for the District of Columbia as mentioned in chapter 3.
Outliers were defined as states with z-scores exceeding an absolute value of 3.0. Thus,
three outliers were found in the data set: Missouri’s state legislated payday loan implied
maximum annual percentage rate (z = 4.70), North Dakota’s state legislated maximum payday
loan maturity term (z = 5.02), and the District of Columbia’s CBS/NYT liberal state electorate
political ideology percentage (z = 4.06).
Bivariate Analyses of State Electorate Political Ideology and State Legislative Responses to
Payday Lending
The present analysis studied the relationships of state electorate and government political
ideology and state legislative responses to payday lending (See Table 2, Correlation Matrix With
Outliers, and Table 3, Correlation Directions With Outliers) and analyzed the data with and
without outliers. The findings without outliers did not vary drastically from the findings with
outliers. Outliers were defined as states with z-scores exceeding an absolute value of 3.0. Thus,
three outliers were found in the data set: Missouri’s state legislated payday loan implied
maximum annual percentage rate (z = 4.70), North Dakota’s state legislated maximum payday
loan maturity term (z = 5.02), and the District of Columbia’s CBS/NYT liberal state electorate
political ideology percentage (z = 4.06).
State Legislated Payday Loan Principle Amounts. State legislated payday loan
principle amounts and liberal political ideology of state electorates were negatively and
moderately correlated (r = -.487, p < .01; without outliers, r = -.460, p < .01), and this dependent
variable and conservative political ideology of state electorates were positively and moderately
correlated (r = .380, p < .05; without outliers, r = .321, p < .05). Both of these correlations were
found in the direction opposite of their corresponding hypotheses. Additionally, this dependent
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variable and liberal state government political ideology were negatively and moderately
correlated (r = -.329, p < .05; without outliers, r = -.329, p < .05) in the direction opposite of its
corresponding hypothesis
State Legislated Payday Loan Implied Maximum Annual Percentage Rates. State
legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates and liberal political ideology
of state electorates were negatively and moderately correlated (r = -.322, p < .05; without
outliers, r = -.350, p < .05) in the expected direction. There was no statistically significant
relationship between this dependent variable and conservative political ideology of state
electorates (r = .220, p = .152; without outliers, r = .222, p = .157 ) or liberal state government
political ideology (r = -.118, p = .453; without outliers, r = -.161, p = .308).
State Legislated Maximum Payday Loan Maturity Terms. There was no statistically
significant relationship between state legislated maximum payday loan maturity terms and liberal
state electorates (r = -.312, p = .068; without outliers, r = -.151, p = .393), conservative state
electorates (r = -.038, p = .830; without outliers, r = .192, p = .275), or liberal state government
political ideology (r = -.153, p = .380; without outliers, r = -.001, p = .996).
Fee Disclosure Requirements. There was also no statistically significant relationship
between fee disclosure requirements and liberal political ideology of state electorates (r = -.103,
p = .551; without outliers, r = -.103, p = .551), conservative political ideology of state electorates
(r = .018, r = .918; without outliers, r = .018, p = .918), or liberal state government political
ideology (r = -.105, p = .541; without outliers, r = -.105, p = .541).
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix With Outliers

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. Maximum Principle Amounts

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

2. Implied Maximum APRs

.596**

--

--

--

--

--

--

3. Maximum Maturity Terms

-.029

-.016

--

--

--

--

--

4. Fee Disclosure Requirements

.037

-.047

.001

--

--

--

--

5. Liberal Electorate Ideology

-.487**

-.322*

-.312

-.103

--

--

--

6. Conservative Electorate Ideology .380*

.220

-.038

-.018

-.757**

--

--

7. State Gov Political Ideology

-.118

-.153

-.105

.213

-.215

--

-.329*

Some of the correlations between dependent variables and between independent variables were presented in the
table above but not in the text since these relationships were not the focus of the study.
* p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
Table 3
Correlation Directions With Outliers
Principle

Implied APR

Term (Days)

Fee Disclosure

H

Result

H

Result

H

Result

H

Result

Liberal Electorate Ideology

+

-**

-

-*

+

-

+

-

Conservative Electorate Ideology

-

+*

+

+

-

-

-

-

State Gov Political Ideology

+

-*

-

-

+

-

+

-

Addition symbols (+) represent a positive relationship, while subtraction symbols (-) represent a negative
relationship.
* p < 0.01
** p < 0.05

38

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
This study analyzed the relationship between state electorate and government political
ideology and their respective states’ legislative responses to payday lending. State electorate
political ideology was represented in the present analysis as percentages of each state’s
respondents in a nationwide survey that responded with liberal or conservative upon being asked
to identify their political ideology (Wright et al., 1985, 2007). State government political
ideology was represented by a government ideology index (GI measure; Berry et al., 1998b).
Respective states’ legislative responses to payday lending were represented as four variables,
namely state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts, state legislated payday loan
implied maximum annual percentage rates, state legislated maximum payday loan maturity
terms, and fee disclosure requirements.
Contributions to the Literature
Walters (1977) has discussed the relationship between liberal and conservative political
ideology and such people’s positions on governmental promotion of corporate social
responsibility. Generally speaking, people of the liberal political ideology prefer governmental
promotion of social responsibility and people of the conservative political ideology do not favor
government involvement (Walters, 1977). Such a line of thinking guided this analysis’
hypotheses.
State Legislated Maximum Payday Loan Principle Amounts. This study
hypothesized that the percentage of liberals and conservatives in each state’s electorate would,
respectively, be positively and negatively correlated with this dependent variable: Graves and
Peterson (2005) opined that higher state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts
represent government regulation that benefits payday loan consumers more than smaller ones
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and, furthermore, liberals favor governmental intervention for corporate social responsibility
while conservatives prefer for corporations to regulate themselves (Walters, 1977). Conversely,
this study found a statistically-significant negative relationship between liberal electorate
political ideology and this dependent variable and a statistically-significant positive relationship
between conservative political ideology and this dependent variable. Similarly, state legislated
maximum payday loan principle amounts and liberal state government political ideology were
hypothesized as positively related but found to be negatively correlated.
The statistically-significant findings opposite of their corresponding hypotheses could
reflect the difference in opinions between the payday lending literature (Graves & Peterson,
2005) and legislators’ intuitive decisions made in the statehouse about the consumer-friendliness
of state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts. State legislators may be either (1)
unfamiliar with Graves and Peterson’s (2005) opinion and may not intuitively think of the
consumer friendliness of higher state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts, or (2)
familiar with Graves and Peterson’s opinion and disagree with it. Indeed, it is reasonable that
people unfamiliar with Graves and Peterson’s (2005) opinion in the payday lending literature
may think that restricting as much as possible the amount of funds for which a payday loan can
be granted would benefit consumers more than increasing the amount of funds. [Upon
completion of the defense of this thesis, some literature (e.g., Edmiston, 2011; McKernan,
Ratcliffe, & Kuehn, 2010; Williams, 2011) was located that argued for the consumer benefits of
decreasing the state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts.]
State Legislated Payday Loan Implied Maximum Annual Percentage Rates. Because
smaller state legislated payday loan implied maximum annual percentage rates provide more
benefit to payday loan consumers than do larger ones (CRL, 2009), this study hypothesized and
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found evidence that the percentage of liberals in each state’s electorate would be negatively
correlated with this variable. The results supported that hypothesis, that both variables are
negatively and moderately correlated.
Limitations
The present analysis has several limitations. With respect to the design of the present
analysis, bivariate correlations were used to determine non-causal relationships between the
independent and dependent variables. In a cross-sectional study, one cannot definitively explain
an increase or decrease in another; rather, one or more extraneous variable(s) can elicit increases
or decreases in both variables. Further, spurious causes cannot be accounted or controlled for
with Pearson’s r correlations.
Additionally, some of the dependent variables had unlimited values that could have
significantly influenced the findings if they were accounted for in some capacity. In the present
analysis, such unlimited values were treated as missing data and, thus, excluded from the
analysis. Finally, data were missing or excluded for Alaska, Hawaii, and Oregon at one or more
points within the analysis, potentially biasing the sample and the results. (See the Methods
chapter for a discussion of the measurements of the dependent variables.)
It is also possible that regional aspects of the differences in political ideology influenced
the results (Williams, 2009). Regionalism refers to the notion that within-group variation exists
across geographic regions or areas (Williams, 2009). Thus, a person identifying with a particular
political ideology in one region of a country can interpret and execute political ideology
substantially different from a second person identifying with the same political ideology in a
region elsewhere in the same country (Williams, 2009). In light of regionalism, perhaps people
of liberal and conservative political ideologies interpret and execute the reconciliation of their
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political ideology and legislative responses to payday lending differently between regions of the
United States of America.
Future Research
Future research should focus on determining the conditions under which states prohibit
payday lending. An event history analysis would provide this useful information to help
policymakers determine the point at which prohibiting the practice comes to fruition. A study of
this sort could consist of data spanning over more than two decades, since payday lending was
born in the 1990s (Robinson & Lewis, 1999, as cited in Graves, 2003). This would yield a large
number of units consisting of each state in each year for two decades, helping control for
extraneous causes not accounted for in the present analysis. Future research should also account
for other internal determinants such as socioeconomic and lobbyist characteristics with each
state, the diffusion of innovation between states, and external determinants such as the nation’s
political and policy contexts (Ringquist & Garand, 1999).
Contributions to the Social Work Literature and to Social Work Practice
The significant findings from this analysis provide several contributions to the literature
and social work practice. This study provided insight into the relationship between liberal and
conservative political ideology and state payday loan policy components previously missing
from the literature. That insight could help social workers interested in state payday loan policy
change use political ideology as an indicator of legislators who could be appealed to regarding
particular state payday loan policy components.
Conclusion
States respond to payday lending in a number of ways, primarily through increasing or
decreasing their state legislated maximum payday loan principle amounts, state legislated payday
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loan implied maximum annual percentage rates, and state legislated maximum payday loan
maturity terms (CRL, 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Fox & Mierzwinski, 2001; Graves & Peterson, 2005).
This thesis found evidence of significance suggestive of the notion that states have varying
degrees of strictness of payday loan legislation and that strictness has some links to liberal and
conservative political ideology.
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